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I. Introduction
THE REMEDIES SECTION OF the Association of American Law Schools

decided to hold a panel discussion at its annual meeting in January 1991
on two 1990 Supreme Court cases, Spallone v. United States' and
Missouriv. Jenkins,2 because these cases raise some troubling questions
about the implementation of constitutional remedies. Not surprisingly,
the State and Local Government Section was also planning a panel
discussion about the same cases because they involve federal courts in
local governmental decisions. Thus, the two Sections combined their
programs into a double, joint session, the proceedings of which are
printed here. This article introduces the cases and discusses the remedial
issues that they present.
II. The Cases
In both Spallone v. United States and Missouri v. Jenkins governmental
units were found liable for constitutional violations. In Spallone, the
City of Yonkers was liable for "intentionally enhancing racial segregation in housing" in violation of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968. 3 In Missouri v. Jenkins the State of Missouri and the Kansas City
*The author would like to thank Professor Burton D. Wechsler for his consultation
concerning taxpayer standing; Alicia Benson, Class of 1990, for her research; and the
Washington College of Law Research Fund which supports faculty research.
1. 493 U.S. 265 (1990).
2. 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
3. Spallone, 493 U.S. at 267.
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Metropolitan School District were liable for "operat[ing] a segregated
school system. ,4
In both cases, to cure the violation the district courts imposed remedies that intruded on local governmental authority. In Spallone, the
district court ultimately ordered city council members to enact legislation with respect to low-income housing, while in Jenkins the district
court ultimately ordered a tax increase. 6
In Spallone the district court initially ordered the city to stop the
violation, to designate sites for public housing in East Yonkers, to
submit a housing plan to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and to develop a long term-plan. 7 After the court of appeals
affirmed the district court, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari,'
the city council voted 5-2 to approve a consent decree by which it agreed
to pass legislation that would require multifamily housing to include
twenty percent assisted units, grant tax abatements and density bonuses
to developers, and change zoning provisions. 9
When the legislation was not passed, the district court ordered the
city to enact it.'° The court gave the city and the council members a
deadline to pass the legislative package or face coercive contempt. The
city would be fined $100 for the first day, with the fine to double each
day of noncompliance." The council members would be fined $500 per
2
day and, after ten days, imprisoned until they passed the legislation. '
Despite the sanctions and despite the consent decree that had been
approved by the city council's vote of five to two, four of the seven city
council members voted not to enact the legislative package. 3 After a
stay, the Second Circuit affirmed all of the sanctions, but limited the
city's fine to $1 million per day. 14 The Supreme Court stayed the sanctions against the council members, but not the city. 5 As the city's fine
approached the Second Circuit's limit, only two members of the city
council continued to oppose the legislative package, which was enacted
4. Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 37.
5. Spallone, 493 U.S. at 271.
6. Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 41.
7. Spallone, 493 U.S. at 269.
8. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Ed., 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1055 (1988).
9. Spallone, 493 U.S. at 270.
10. Id. at 271.
11. Id. at 271-72.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 272.
14. United States v. Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988).
15. Yonkers, 487 U.S. 1064 (1988).
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by a vote of five to two. 16 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 17 on

the issue of sanctions against the council members, but not the city,
because of the importance of "the appropriate exercise of the federal
judicial power against individual legislators." 8
In Jenkins, the district court had initially estimated its remedial
scheme to cost approximately $88 million, and required the state and
school district to share the cost. 19 The order was later expanded at
greater cost. The order approved a school district proposal for a system
of magnet schools and capital improvements. 20 To enable the school
district to raise the money, the court enjoined a state law that prohibited
the school district from getting increased revenue from increased property assessments and ordered that the district submit a proposal for a
tax increase to the voters. 2' After the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court, the Supreme Court denied certiorari,22 and the voters rejected
the tax increase, the district court ordered that the property tax be
"raised from $2.05 to $4.00 per $100 of assessed valuation.", 23 The
state again appealed. The Eighth Circuit upheld the scope of the remedy,24 but, with respect to the tax increase, held that the trial court
should, in the future, authorize the school district to submit a levy,
rather than set the levy itself. 25 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari
26

"limited to the question of the property tax increase."
In both cases the courts of appeals had affirmed the liability and the
substantive remedy ordered by the district court. The Supreme Court
had denied certiorari on those issues but later granted certiorari on the
implementation of the remedy.2 7 The Supreme Court held, in both
Spallone and Jenkins, that the district courts had abused their discretion
in implementing the remedy.28
16. Spallone, 493 U.S. at 265, 273.

17. Spallone v. United States, 489 U.S. 1064 (1989).
18. Spallone, 493 U.S. at 273.
19. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 40-41 (1990).
20. Id.at 41.
21. Id.at 39.
22. Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom. Kansas
City, Missouri, Sch. Dist. v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 816, and cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816
(1987).
23. Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 41.
24. Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1301-07 (8th Cir. 1988), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990).
25. Id. at 1314.
26. Missouri v. Jenkins, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989).
27. See Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 273-74 (1990) (no question about
liability or the district court's remedial order); Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 53. ("We accept,
without approving or disapproving,. . . that the District Court's remedy was proper.").
28. Spallone, 493 U.S. at 280; Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 35.
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In Spallone, the Court held that the district court should have waited
to see if the sanctions against the city alone would have worked. 29 It
did not hold, however, that such sanctions could never be used. Four
Justices, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, dissented on the
ground that the district judge had good reasons to sanction simultaneously the city and the city council and that those sanctions would hasten
compliance.30
In Jenkins, the Supreme Court agreed with the Eighth Circuit that
the district court should have "authorized [the school district] to submit32
3
a levy to the state. . . tax authorities,", rather than levy the tax itself,
but disagreed that the tax increase already ordered directly by the district
court judge could stand.33 The Supreme Court did not hold that a court
could never impose a tax itself. 34 Four Justices, Kennedy, Rehnquist,
O'Connor, and Scalia, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.
They concurred that the petition had been timely filed and in the judgment reversing the Eighth Circuit's order that affirmed the district
court's past order of a tax increase. 35 Those four Justices disagreed that
the issue of the future tax increase was before the Court and indicated
that if it were, any judicially ordered tax increase, whether directly
ordered or directed to officials to levy a tax, would be beyond the
Court's powers under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.36
H. Remedial Problems
A. Focus on Comity, Not Remedy
Both Spallone and Jenkins quoted from Whitcomb v. Chavis,37 that
while "remedial powers of an equity court must be adequate to the task,
...they are not unlimited." 3 In both cases the court's discussion of
those limitations professed to apply general principles of equity courts,
but was actually based on the particular issues raised by a federal court
telling local governmental institutions what to do. Spallone said federal
courts "must take into account the interests of state and local authorities
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
or the
35.
36.
37.
38.

Spallone, 493 U.S. at 280.
Id. at 280-81 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 52.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 51.
The Court did not reach the issues whether the tax increase violated Article 1I
Tenth Amendment. Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 50.
Id. at 58 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Id. at 65 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
403 U.S. 124, 161 (1971).
Spallone, 493 U.S. at 276; Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 51.
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in managing their own affairs. 3 9 Jenkins said that "one of the most
important considerations governing the exercise of equitable power is
a proper respect for the integrity and function of local government
institutions. "40 Spallone then said that when using contempt a court
must use the" 'least possible power adequate to the end proposed.' "41
Similarly, Jenkins said that "the District Court was obliged to assure
itself that no permissible alternative would have accomplished the required task." 42
Thus, both Spallone and Jenkins were discussing comity, not equity
per se,43 in their concern for intrusion into local governmental affairs
and their conclusion that the method to implement the remedy should
be no stronger than necessary. While before Spallone and Jenkins comity had been recognized to be an important and delicate issue whenever
a federal court is involved with local governmental matters, the thrust
of those cases was to elevate comity in relation to another important
focus-a remedial one. Spallone and Jenkins involve violations of the
constitution that should be remedied. By focusing on comity, the Court's
attention is on the intrusiveness of the remedy. But a remedial focus
looks at what is necessary to remedy a violation and the effectiveness
of various means of implementing the remedy. Millikin v. Bradley,44
cited by Spallone for the proposition that federal courts must take into
account the concerns of local governments, recognized that both comity
and remedial necessity are important.45 Milliken II listed three factors
that federal courts must consider. In addition to the local government
concern, Milliken IIheld that courts must consider the nature and scope
39. Spallone, 493 U.S. at 276 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 28081(1977)).
40. Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 51.
41. Spallone, 493 U.S. at 272 (quoting United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d
444, 454 (1988) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821))).
Anderson v. Dunn held that an imprisonment for contempt of Congress must not
continue beyond Congress's adjournment. Id. at 231 (1821). Anderson, therefore, is
a case about the scope of the contempt power, not discretion. Other cases cited by
Spallone for the "least possible power adequate to the end proposed," see Spallone,
493 U.S. at 280, also deal with the scope of power of contempt. These cases include:
In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945) (holding that a federal court could not hold someone
in criminal contempt for perjury alone, and thus deprive that person of a jury trial);
Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966) (holding that while a court can imprison
someone to compel testimony, the imprisonment cannot last beyond the length of the
grand jury).
42. Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 51.
43. Equitable principles are broad. Two important principles are that equity gives
extraordinary, not ordinary, relief and that equitable relief is granted at the discretion
of the court. See HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY, § 21, at 46-47 (2d ed. 1948).
44. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken 11).
45. Id. at 280-81.
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of the constitutional violation and must design the remedy to restore the
victims of discrimination to where they would have been without the
violation. 46 Spallone, however, did not quote those other factors in
Milliken II, and thus by implication diminished the relative importance
of the promptness and full effectiveness of the remedy.
B. Puzzling Focus on Nonparty Status
The majority in Spallone and the concurrence in Jenkins, both of which
included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and
Kennedy, found significance in the nonparty status of certain individuals. In Spallone, the majority noted that the portions of the district
judge's order that required affirmative action were directed only at the
city, while the prohibitory decree explicitly referred to officers and
agents. The Court also noted that the city council members were
not parties and had not been found personally liable.48 The dissent
questioned the relevance of the majority's remarks. It noted that Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) automatically binds officers and agents
and that the preamble to the judge's order referred to officers and
agents. 49 Was the majority reading "officers" and "agents" to exclude
all legislative personnel? If so, that premise was not spelled out.
The concurrence in Jenkins believed that a court cannot assess a tax
because, inter alia, the taxpayers "whose property . . . was at stake
were neither served with process nor heard in court." 50 It may be that
the concurring Justices were merely embellishing their point that any
action by the Court to compel municipal expenditures has an undemocratic element that should be avoided, even if at some cost to effective
enforcement of minority rights. But to phrase the issue in terms of who
is a party to a lawsuit is problematic.
Whenever a court orders a remedy against a municipality which will
cost money, it is requiring the municipality either to raise taxes or to
divert money from one use to another. In those cases the taxpayers, or
the people affected by the diversion, are not parties. It may be that the
remedy is undemocratic, but judicial protection of minority rights is a
constitutionally mandated check on the power of the majority.
Problems of remedies affecting nonparties occur in a number of
contexts. For example, when courts invalidate a statute that provides
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 280.
Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 274 (1990).
Id. at 274.
Id. at 304 n. 14 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 67 (1990).
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benefits to one group on the ground that it wrongfully excluded another
group, then courts will choose between extending the benefits to both
groups or canceling them altogether.-' The beneficiaries may never
have been parties. The statute could be invalidated at the behest of a
plaintiff seeking to avoid providing benefits by suing an agency administering the benefits.52 With either remedy, nonparties may be affected.
If the benefits are withdrawn, their recipients will be affected. If the
benefits are extended, the taxpayers will be affected. And one way
or the other, to cure the violation, the court must interfere with the
legislation.
The impact of remedies on nonparties is an important issue and one
not always focused on by the courts.5 3 The Supreme Court held in
Martin v. Wilks, 4 that a directly impacted and clearly defined group,
such as employees who will lose rights under an affirmative action
consent decree, had a right to be heard concerning a remedy despite not
having timely intervened.55 However, the fact that a remedy may have
an impact on a broad nonparty group should not be the sole reason for
denying it. Particularly with constitutional violations, no remedy may
be possible that does not affect an entire community. The Supreme
Court has long held that standing to object to legislation generally cannot
be based solely on taxpayer status.56 Would the concurrence in Jenkins
give taxpayers the right to block a remedy, even though their elected
representatives have been taking unconstitutional actions?
C. Is Abuse of Discretion the ProperAnalysis?
The opinions in Spallone and Jenkins are not clear as to whether each
has stated a rule or whether the outcomes were limited to the facts of
51. See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979). In cases not involving
benefits, the courts may take no position on the remedy and defer to the legislature.
See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)
(bankruptcy courts violate the Constitution; Congress directed to amend the legislation
creating those courts).
52. See, e.g., California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987)
(bank sued state agency to invalidate mandatory pregnancy leave statute, pregnant
employee seeking reinstatement was denied leave to intervene).
53. Candace S. Kovacic, Remedying UnderinclusiveStatutes, 33 WAYNE L. REV.
39, 56 (1986).
54. 490 U.S. 755 (1989). Martin v. Wilks has been limited by section 108 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.
55. Id.
56. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974);
Frothingham v. Mellon 262 U.S. 447 (1923). It is beyond the scope of this article to
discuss the exception to the general rule recognized in separation of church and state
cases. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
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the cases. 57 In both cases the Supreme Court said that the district judges
had abused their discretion.58 When the Court framed the issue, it
sounded specific to the facts of the case. The Court said, "The nub of
the matter, then, is whether, in the light of the reasonable probability
that sanctions against the city would accomplish the desired result, it
was within the court's discretion to impose sanctions on the petitioners
as well under the circumstances of this case. 5 9 Spallonethen discussed
facts to show the "reasonable probability" that the sanctions against
the city alone would work. 60 Those facts, however, were the ones which
to the majority indicated a reasonable likelihood that the city council
would act; they seem to cement rather than negate the connection between the city and the city council. 6' Because those facts are therefore
not very persuasive as to why sanctions against the city alone would
work, it appears that the Court was really articulating a rule that sanctions can be used against local legislators only after sanctions against
the locality have not worked. The last paragraph of the opinion is written
more like a rule and less like a conclusion about abuse of discretion. 62
In Jenkins, the only factual discussion with respect to why the judge
abused his discretion was that the "[local government] institutions are
ready, willing, and-but for the operation of state law curtailing their
powers-able to remedy the deprivation of constitutional rights themselves" and that the district court judge thought he "had no alternative
to imposing a tax increase. ,63 Again, however, the case reads more

57. The dissent in Spallone said, "The Court's decision today. .. creates no new
principle of law; indeed, it invokes no principle of any sort." Spallone v. United States,
493 U.S. 265, 306 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 274 ("the District Court's order ... imposing contempt sanctions against
the petitioners if they failed to vote in favor of the court-proposed ordinance was an
abuse of discretion .... "); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51 (1990) ("The District
Court therefore abused its discretion in imposing the tax itself.").
59. Spallone, 493 U.S. at 278.
60. According to the dissent in Spallone, that "reasonable probability" had been
assessed differently by the district judge who had found that the council members were
acting as "political martyrs" without considering the best interests of the city. Id. at
293-94 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61. The Court said, "It was the city, in fact, which capitulated ... [because] the
city council ... finally enacted the affordable housing ordinance by a vote of 5 to 2."
Id. at 277 (emphasis added). And previous sanctions against the city alone had caused
the city council to support a resolution. Id.
62. The Spallone majority concluded, "We hold that the District Court... should
have proceeded with such contempt sanctions first against the city alone .... Only if
that approach failed . . . should the question of imposing contempt sanctions against
the city council members even have been considered." Id. at 280.
63. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51 (1990).
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like a rule that the judge should never directly order a tax increase,
rather than a discussion of discretion. 64
If the Supreme Court is articulating rules of remedial implementation,
those would be clearer if not phrased in terms of judicial discretion.
When judicial rules are unclear, parties are more likely to litigate.65
As these cases illustrate, disputes over remedial implementation delay
correction of the constitutional violations which were resolved earlier.
D. Questions About the Breadth of Jenkins
Although Jenkins was not a case applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 70, it raises the question whether a district judge could choose one
of the options considered, but rejected, by the district court in Spallone.
In Spallone the district judge considered using Rule 70 to have the act
deemed done, to deem the legislative package enacted. 66 Jenkins holds
that a court cannot order a tax itself, but must order the officials to levy
it. 67 Since a tax is a legislative act, does Jenkins apply to all remedies
requiring local legislation, or is Jenkins limited to cases involving taxes?
E. Possible Consequences of Spallone and Jenkins
Jenkins held that a district court could not raise taxes itself to remedy
constitutional violations but must order the local officials to raise them.68
Jenkins did not deal with the situation when local officials are unwilling
to act, however, because in that case the local officials were "ready"
and "willing" to act. 69 If, however, in a future case a district court
follows the Jenkins approach and orders officials to raise taxes, and
those officials refuse, then one has Spallone. Although under Jenkins
ajudge can order the officials to take legislative acts, under Spallone the
court cannot sanction the legislators for refusing to act unless sanctions
against the locality fail. Thus, the court must first fine the locality. Then
the locality will have to raise money to pay the fine when it cannot raise
64. The Court said, "Authorizing and directing local government institutions to
devise and implement remedies not only protects the function of those institutions but,
to the extent possible, also places the responsibility for solutions to the problems of
segregation upon those who have themselves created the problems." Id. at 1663.
65. See Candace S. Kovacic, A Proposalto Simplify Quantum MeruitLitigation, 35
Am. U. L. REv. 549, 562 (1986) (when courts are unclear as to the method of analysis,
litigation may be unpredictable and unnecessary).
66. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 275 (1990). The district court also
considered transferring the council's functions to a housing commission. Id.
67. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 51.
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money to remedy the constitutional violation. If it does not raise money
to pay the fine, what will the court do-impose a fine upon a fine?
In the meantime, the locality faces the severe consequences of uncollected garbage, closed libraries and parks, and layoffs described in
Spallone, while the delay is caused by those officials who cannot
be sanctioned. In this circumstance the community may be forced to
confront the consequences of disobedience to the Constitution without
its elected officials serving as a buffer against those consequences.
While potentially slowing the remedy, this process may increase community pressure on the legislators. It may also, however, increase the
community's resentment of the federal courts, which is just what Spallone and Jenkins, with their concern for comity are presumably trying
to prevent.

70. Spallone, 493 U.S. at 277.

